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THE CORPORATE TRUSTEE PROBLEM
By ALBERT R. JoNEs*
INTRODUCTION
In the past decade the corporate trustee has come to occupy
a rather unique position in modern finance and is now the pivo-
tal institution about which revolve financial schemes of gigan-
tic proportions.' Because of the increasingly important part
the trustee device has played and is continuing to play in
establishing contact between the money needs of the business
world on the one hand and the multitude of investors on the
other, the time appears to be appropriate for an analysis of some
of the rights, duties, powers and liabilities which are affected
by the corporate trustee-bondholder relationship.
2
Both in law and in practice, the reliance of the security
holder upon the trustee for protection of his investment is com-
plete and it is a matter of common knowledge that purchasers
of securities seldom examine the terms of the trust deed, al-
though they are legally bound by its terms. 3 This very fact is
given added significance in the light of the multitude of cases
involving certain aspects of the trustee-bondholder relationship
*Attorney at law, New York, N. Y.; address: Apt. 305, 314 E: 41st
St. A. B., University of Kentucky, 1933; LL. B., University of Ken-
tucky, 1936; graduate student and research fellow, Yale School of Law,
1936-7.
1 "The security issues represented in the United States by such
trustees at the close of the year 1934 are estimated to have reached the
huge total of $37,000,000,000." Posner, The Trustee and the Trust
Indenture: A Further Study (1937) 46 Yale L. J. 737, 738.
2For a discussion of other problems relating to the trustee-
bondholder relationship see generally, supra n. 1; Posner, Liability of
the Trustee Under the Corporate Indenture (1928) 42 Harv. L. Rev.
198; Protection for Debenture Holders (1936) 46 Yale L. J. 97; (1937)
37 Col. L. Rev. 130.
3 Hazzard v. Chase National Bank of City of New York, 287 N. Y. S.
541, 545, 159 Misc. 57 (1936).
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which, in the past few years, has besieged the courts.4 A decade
ago case law and legal literature concerning the trustee device
was comparatively sparse5 and most of the decisions on this sub-
ject have been delivered in the period beginning immediately
after the stock market crash of 1929. These cases deal mainly
with the duties of trustees named in indentures and the extent
of protection they derive from immunity clauses, which nor-
mally are inserted in such instruments; in addition, the subject
has received elaborate treatment at the hands of various tri-
bunals authorized by Congress6 to explore the extent of the
duties and immunities concomitant to the corporate trustee
institution.
Investigations of the S. E. C.7 have brought to light various
instances in which trustees (and in that term other fiduciaries
such as deposit committees are included), have either inad-
vertently allowed, or consciously permitted themselves,8 to
be placed in situations where their interests and those of the
bondholders, whom they represent, are conflicting to some
degree and are frequently diametrically opposed. Quite often it
has happened that certain parties to the scheme, whereby securi-
ties are issued, whose interests are in no way compatible with
those of the investing public, have insinuated themselves, or
their subordinates, into the position of trustee, thereby enabling
them to profit at the expense of investors who rely upon their
integrity for protection of the underlying security. Such is
'It is interesting to note In this connection that in the past ten
years the cases on this subject have practically doubled in number
those of the preceding fifty years.
5 Posner, supra note 2, 42 Harv. L. Rev. at 199.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the Study and
Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel and Functions of Pro-
tective and Reorganization Committees, Part III, Committees for the
Holders of Real Estate Bonds (1936) and Part VI, Trustees Under
Indentures (1936). Hereafter the Commission will be referred to as
the "S. E. C." and the Report as the "S. E. C. Report."
7 Ibid.
8 Such a situation usually arises through the trustee affiliating
Itself with protective committees. Since the trustee is often an affiliate
or subsidiary of the house of issue, or frequently one of its officers, It
is idle to expect a committee of such a composition to check the fair-
ness of the reorganization plan promulgated by the issuer and designed
to keep the present management in control. Other instances of con-
flict are occasioned by the identity of interest between the trustee and
the owners of junior securities or equity interests. See generally
S. E. C. Report, Part VI, op. cit., supra note 6, at pages 71-110.
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the case where the indenture designates an officer or affiliate of
the house of issue as trustee of the issue.9
It is not the purpose of this paper to cover all phases of
liability of trustees under corporate indentures since most of
them have, in a broad way, been ably dealt with elsewhere.' 0
But its aim is to consider, from a purely legal point of view,
some of the rights.and liabilities arising out of various practices
engaged in by fiduciaries," associated with security issues, as
disclosed by the S. E. C. investigation hitherto referred to.
NATURE Op' THE TRUSTEE-BONDHOLDER RE .TIoNSHIP
Comparatively speaking, use of the trustee device under an
indenture is of fairly recent origin, the first instrument of this
type, of which there is record, having been executed in 1830.12
Only gradually did the practice became prevalent. In the ear-
liest examples the trustees were hardly more than mere stake.
holders and the indenture itself was more in the nature of an
escrow agreement than a deed of trust.'3 At this early period it
would have been idle to suggest that the trustee had any active
duties to the bondholder for it was a common practice to name
as trustee an officer of the mortgagor,14 to whom property was
'"In most of the indentures under which real estate bonds were
Issued, an officer or affiliate of the house of issue was designated as
trustee ... Thus in the case of 84 Straus issues, secured by properties
located In California and in the Pacific Northwest, and outstanding on
February 27, 1931, Straus executive officers were acting as trustees
for 77 issues, while trustees for only 7 issues had no apparent connec-
tion with the underwriter."
1OPosner, sapra note 1.
uIn this connection "fiduciary" is intended to include corporate
trustees under indentures and trust deeds and various bondholder
protective committees.
See Willink v. The Morris Canal and Banking Co., 4 N. J. Eq.
377 (1843), where the court speaks of the trustee as "a nominal trus-
tee." In this case the trustee was a single individual who had nego-
tiated a loan of $750,000 In the city of Amsterdam. The case is cited
and commented on in Smith, A Forgotten Chapter in the Early His-
tory of the Corporate Trust Deed, (1927) 61 Am. L. Rev. 900, 904. "In
1839 there occurred the earliest case on record of a trust company
acting as trustee for a corporate mortgage," and this was probably
the first true mortgage to a trustee. Smith, supra at 908.
i Smith, supra note 12 at 907 If.
" See Draper, A Historical Introduction to the Corporate Mort-
gage (1930), 2 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 71, 84, where it is also said that
"apparently the idea of possible conflict of interest of the trustee had
not crept in, because we find numerous examples in which the same
individual or individuals acted as trustee under two or more mortgages
executed by the same company."
KENTUCKY LAW JOuRNArL
transferred to secure the corporate obligation; and this despite
the fact that the interests of the officer-trustee were obviously
adverse to those of the bondholders.
The additional fact that it was usual for the early inden-
ture not to specify any active duties for the trustee15 makes
it more than ever apparent that the so-called trustee's functions
were no different than those exercised under a dry trust; i. e.,
to hold the legal title. In no sense was the trustee considered
an additional safeguard to the investors and more than often
he owed his very existence as trustee to considerations of con-
venience for the mortgagor. Apparently it was not until 190010
that such a trustee was actually held to a personal liability on
the theory of breach of trust. Even at the present date the
cases which impose such liability are comparatively few.
17
From this brief survey of the early development of the
device it seems clear that (1) in the beginning it was not intended
that the trustee should be more than a mere stakeholder; (2)
there was no drastic and practical need for anything else; and
(3) the courts were a long time in deciding that the trustee was
anything more than a mere stakeholder.
With the increase of security issues to vast sums' 8 and
their distribution throughout the world, a change in the purpose
and the function of the trustee has been accomplished. Where-
as, in the beginning, the office was intended to serve only the
convenience of the mortgagor,' 9 the trustee is now regarded as
2 See e. g., Sturges v. Knapp, 31 Vt. 1 (1858); cf. Merchantile
Trust Co. v. Portland and Ogdensburg R. Co., 10 Fed. 605 (C. C. N. H.
1882), where the court held that although the mortgage imposed no
duties on the trustee it was made by virtue of the laws of Maine which
provide on this subject and therefore relieved the parties from the
necessity of providing therefor in each mortgage.
16 See Polhemus v. Holland Trust Co., 61 N. J. Eq. 654, 47 Atl. 417
(1900), where a mortgage trustee, without the proper certificate,
authenticated and issued bonds that by the terms of the trust were
issuable only on a certificate by the mortgagor that their amount had
been expended on the mortgaged premises, when, in fact, such amount
had not been expended. But the possibility of personal liability had
been indicated earlier. See in this connection Merrill v. Farmer's Loan
and Trust Co., 24 Hun. 297 (1881).
17Note, Immunity Clauses in Corporate Trust Indentures (1933),
33 Col. L. Rev. 97, 100.
18 See note 12, supra.
19 Posner, supra note 1, 46 Yale L. J., at 738. Of course the mort-
gage could have been given to all the bondholders, to be held jointly
by them. There is nothing unworkable in such a plan and it was
CORPORATE TRUSTED PROBTEAn
the watchdog standing between investors, on the one hand
(who are chiefly widely separated and unable to act with
instant and complete unanimity), and, on the other hand, the
issuer who is in possession of the property intended for the
bondholder's security. 20 Such reliance which has been placed
on the trustee,-at present usually a banking corporation,-by
the investors, has generally come to be such a large factor in
the flotation of a security issue that the standing of the trustee
is, in a measure, regarded as a certificate of the issuer's standing
and serves to "encourage the sale of securities" and "give
tone to the obligation.''21 Corporations seeking credit have not
been slow to turn this tendency to their own advantage.
Prompted by the fact that certain early cases have spoken of the
trustee's liability in terms of the old familiar equity jurispru-
used at least once in the United States. See Nashville and Decatur
R. R. Co. v. Ovor, 85 U. S. 471 (1873). "Probably it was the ancient
doctrine that legal title passes with the mortgage that led to a feeling
that it would be simpler to have one person hold that title." See
Note (1933), 33 Col. L. Rev. 97, 99.
2')This, at least, is the naive belief of the larger investing public,
although the feeling is probably dwindling in intensity under the
glare of recent congressional investigations. It is interesting to note
that just prior to the stock market crash of 1929 at least one legal
writer enthusiastically epitomized what was then a general feeling to
the effect that "in practice, their [trustees'] standards of administra-
tion have been so much higher than the express requirements of the
corporate indenture that comparatively few instances have invoked
criticism in the past half century." Posner, supra note 2, 42 Harv. L.
Rev. at 248. For a later opinion of the same writer see generally,
Posner, supra note 1, 36 Yale L. J. 737. The trustees themselves have
no such exalted view of their own functions under indentures. In
this connection see S. E. C. Report, Part VI, supra note 6, at page 4,
where the testimony of a trustee officer was as follows:
"Q. You think the corporate trustee is merely a mechanical
agency?
A. Yes.
Q. That is, it is a sort of finer bookkeeping agency, and also
an instrument, a vehicle, as you put it, which can be put into
motion by the bondholders?
A. By the bondholders.
Q. Would you say that that defines all the duties of a cor-
porate trustee?
A. I would."
"See Northampton Trust Co. v. Northampton Traction Co., 270
Pa. 199, 112 Atl. 871 (1921). This fact was recognized over fifty years
ago. "The salability of railroad bonds depends in no inconsiderable
degree upon the character of the persons who are selected to manage
the trust. If these persons are of well-known integrity and pecuniary
ability, the bonds are more readily sold than if this were not the
case." Knapp v. Troy and Boston R. Co., 20 Wall. 117 (U. S. 1873.)
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dence, 22 corporations were quick to capitalize on the popular
understanding of this relationship, employed the word "trust"
and the character of a reputable trust company to attract funds.
The fact that courts have frequently stated that bond purchasers
are not justified in relying on this representation does not
vitiate the fact that they do rely on it and that this reliance
has been consciously induced by the corporation.
Vested in the beginning with the fewest possible powers, the
trustee has seen the trust indenture provisions multiply, under
the spur of modern finance, until the instrument "grew to the
largest of all legal documents." 28 And with this development
the powers of the trustee grew, as did his duties, but not
commensurably. These duties have been limited to a great ex-
tent by the inclusion of immunity clauses, but much reason for
this limitation may also be found in the attitude of the courts
to which the problem has been addressed. What, then, is the
present attitude of the courts and what duties, other than those
expressed in the indenture, if any, have they imposed on the
corporate trustee?
Use of the term "trustee," with its varying connotations,.
has made the task of the courts, in identifying the exact rela-
tionship that exists between trustee and bondholder, more dif-
ficult. Having in mind the private trust, courts 24 and text
writers2 5 have frequently stated that the relationship is that of
trustee and cestui que trustent and that the legal consequences
attach quite independently of the convenants of the trust inden-
tures. But there is, perhaps, an equal number of cases
that take contrary position.26 While it is plain that at some
"See Sturges v. Knapp, 31 Vt. 1 (1858), where the bondholders
are referred to as "cestui que trustent."
2Posner, supra note 1, at 739.
21See Guardian Trust Co. v. White Cliffs Portland Cement Co.,
109 Fed. 523 (C. C. Ark. 1901); First National Bank v. Salisbury, 130
Mass. 303 (1881); Rhinelander v. Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 172
N. Y. 519, 65 N. E. 499 (1902); Sprigg v. Title Ins. and Trust Co., 206
Pa. 548, 56 Atl. 33 (1903); Sturges v. Knapp, 31 Vt. 1 (1858).
-2 Perry, Trusts (7th Ed. 1929). Vol. 2, § 749; Posner, supra
note 2.
See in particular Ainsa v. Merchantile Trust Co., 174 Cal. 504,
163 Pac. 898 (1917), where it is said that a trustee under an ordinary
deed of trust does not assume the same obligations cast upon a trus-
tee by operation of law but is the common agent of both parties and
required to act impartially.
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points the corporate trustee has much in common with the pri-
vate trustee, at other points the divergence is significant. In
the first place the trustee represents his beneficiary solely and
the latter's interests are the only ones he need protect. On the
other hand, the corporate trustee must see not only to the
interests of the security holders, but, in a measure, also to those
of the issuing company.27 This dual duty manifests itself upon
breach of conditions of the trust deed thus giving the trustee
the right to make entry and collect rents,28 in which capacity the
bondholders are being represented; or in a particular phase of
the transaction the trustee may represent the mortgagor corpo-
ration alone, as in the collecting of payments from the mortgagor
to be paid the bondholders.2 9 Thus it is readily seen that for some
purposes the trustee represents one, for some the other, and for
still other purposes it represents both.
30
The duties of a private trustee arise to a greater extent
from his relationship to his cestui than from the instrument
creating the trust. Then general rules of conduct which have
been developed in equity for his guidance are not based pri-
marily on the provisions of the instrument, for very often such
provisions are so few and impose so lenient a responsibility that
were they alone to serve as guide posts to the trustee the
advantages and powers of the relationship would be too often
abused. Therefore, Equity has developed certain rules apart
from provisions in the instrument, designed to carefully and
effectively control the conduct of the private trustee. Such
of these is the general duty not to acquire interests inconsistent
with those of his cestui.
3 1
On the other hand, the duties of a mere depositary or stake-
holder are vastly different. Its duties are found almost entirely
in the terms of the indenture. The property is placed in its care
'7 Ibid.
11 Schroeder v. Berlin Arcade Real Estate Co., 175 Wis. 79, 134
N. W. 542 (1921).
29Morley v. University of Detroit, 263 Mich. 126, 248 N. W. 570,
90 A. L. R. 464 (1933); Staten Island Cricket and Baseball Club v.
Farmer's Loan and Trust Co., 41 App. Div. 321, 58 N. Y. S. 460 (1899).
" Central Trust Co. v. Owsley, 188 Ill. App. 505, 522 (1914);
Hidden v. Washington-Oregon Corp., 217 Fed. 303, 304 (W. D. Wash.
1914), where in a suit to remove a mortgage trustee, the corporate
mortgagor was held to be a necessary party.
See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458 (1928); Wendt v. Fisher,
243 N. Y. 439 (1926).
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under certain terms and at a specified time; or upon the per-
formance of certain conditions he is required to deliver it up to
the person mentioned in the agreement as the proper one to
receive it. Beyond the usual care required for the preservation
of the property while in his possession he has few obligations to
the parties to the agreement.
Somewhere in between the private trustee and the stake-
holder is the modern corporate trustee. His duties and liabilities
partake of the qualities of both and arise not only out of the
terms of the indenture but also out of his relationship with the
bondholders and with the mortgagor.
For the most part the courts have tended to regard the
corporate trustee as being in the position of neither the stake-
holder nor the ordinary trustee. 32 It has been argued that to
regard the corporate trustee as a nilere stakeholder is to under-
estimate its responsibilities33 since the trustee is the only agency
avowedly designed for the protection of security holders during
the entire life of the security and under the modern trust
indenture it alone is capable of effective action. The security
holders, as individuals, are powerless and the labor and expense
of assembling fellow security holders into a joint enterprise for
protecting their investment is well nigh prohibitive. On the
other hand, to treat the corporate trustee as an ordinary trustee
is also a mistake since it overstates the extent of its duties and
subjects it to a standard of conduct not required by the trust
deed. Whereas, as stated above, many of the duties and liabili-
ties of the private trustee are not deraigned from the instrument
creating the trust but on the contrary are implied by the courts
from the nature of the relationship, the powers and duties of
the corporate trustee, according to a recent case, 34 are derived
exclusively from contract, that is to say, the trust indenture.
And further, it is suggested, that the word "trustee" is a
12"Certainly it would seem true that the trustee under a trust
deed to secure a bond issue is not to be held to have assumed as oner-
ous an obligation as does the testamentary trustee. It would seem
equally true that it is a mistake and an understatement of its responsi-
bilities to treat it as a mere depositary or stakeholder." Marshall &
Ilsley Bank v. Guaranty Inv. Co., 250 N. W. 862, 864 (Wis. 1933).
3Posner, supra note 2, 42 Harv. L. Rev. at 200. Cf. Ainsa v. Mer-
chantile Trust Co., supra note 15.
" Hazzard v. Chase Nat. Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 287 N. Y. S. 541 (Sup.
Ct. 1936).
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misnomer when applied in this respect. But there is respectable
authority to the effect that there exists between the trustee and
the bondholders, by reason of their respective positions, a
fiduciary relationship which may be modified but not obliterated
by contract. 35
The draftsmen of trust indentures, and afterwards the
courts which construe them, have usually concluded that the
indenture is a contract which binds the security holders even
though they had no part in its making.30 Accordingly, those
who have contributed to the evolution of the trustee under these
indentures have given almost exclusive consideration and weight
to the intent of the parties to the indenture and have assumed
that this contract between trustee and issuer is binding on securi-
ty holders on the theory that they acquire only such rights as
the contract, which these parties have made, gives them. Thus,
the supposition is that the indenture represents the intent of the
bondholders whose loan it secures. But this is, in fact, not true.
Since the indenture is a product solely of those persons desirous
of obtaining the loan, namely, the mortgagor, the underwriter,
and the trustee, it reflects only their respective interests. It
may, of course, be argued that the bondholder was under no
obligation to purchase if he did not accede to the terms of the
indenture. But attention should be brought to the fact that very
few prospective purchasers, especially among the large class
of small investors, so much as glance at the indenture provisions.37
In fact, experience has shown that trust deeds and like instru-
ments are sometimes difficult to find, assuming that the investor
has the inclination to peruse such contracts. How many of such
prospective purchasers would be able to understand the indenture
provisions and ferret out the motives behind the clever phrasing,
is another matter. Assuming that the individual investor had
this ability, he is in no position, normally, to bargain for special
Harvey v. Guaranty Trust Co., 134 Misc. 417, 236 N. Y. S. 37
(Sup. Ct. 1929), affd. without opinion, 229 App. Div. 774, 242 N. Y. S.
905 (1930); State v. Comer, 176 Wash. 257, 28 Pac. (2d) 1027 (1934);
Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Guaranty Inv. Co., 250 N. W. 862 (Wis.
1933).
' Hazzard v. Chase National Bank, supra note 34; Browning v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 250 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1918), cert. denied, 248
U. S. 564 (1918).
'7 Hazzard v. Chase National Bank, supra note 34, at 545.
K. L. J.-2
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provisions and certainly prospective buyers normally cannot
unite in anticipation of an issue to exact desired terms.
This inequality of bargaining power between the investor
and the issuers, along with the tendency of the bankers, lawyers
and courts, who have largely contributed to the evolution of
the trustee, to minimize the latter's duties, has directly resulted
in certain practices during times of financial stress which have
served to improve the financial position of the trustee at the
expense of the bondholders.3 8 The presence of exculpatory pro-
visions in the indenture, designed to relieve the trustee of all
responsibility save for gross negligence or willful default, and
the tendency of the courts to recognize the corporate trustee not
in the same light as the private trustee, with corresponding
duties, but, as something less and more nearly akin to a stake-
holder, have operated to relieve the trustee, at least before de-
fault, of any substantial or active duties and to that extent have
lessened the security of the bondholders.
It is obvious, after following the direction which growth
of the corporate trustee device has taken, that there exists a
crying need for clarification of the exact relationship which
exists between trustee and bondholder. The reluctance of the
courts to adequately define and enforce the obligations of the
parties to the trust indenture has only served to muddle a sit-
uation which, if the huge investments of the investing public are
to be protected, most emphatically needs the clarification and
supervision of constructive legislation.
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES AFTER DEFAULT
Events of default are clearly defined in the indenture and
upon their occurrence the trustee can usually not only commence
action for the appropriate remedy, including foreclosure pro-
ceedings, but also accelerate payment of the entire principal
amount of the unmatured and outstanding bonds. Usually an
event of default occurs when principal or interest payments
have not been met for a specified time or where certain con-
ditions arise which affect the security and are allowed to re-
main unremedied for a specified period after notice and demand
gee generally S. E. C. Report, Part VI, op. et., snpra note 6, at
pages 71-110.
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by the trustee or by the holders of a specified proportion of the
bonds. Most important of the so-called events of default and
the one that most frequently occurs, is the failure in meeting
principal and interest payments and it is to this phase of
default that we address ourselves here.
Usually, the trustee learns of a default before the bond-
holders. Reasons for this may be found in the fact that not
infrequently the trustee is also the paying agent under the inden-
ture, or its affiliate, subsidiary, or principal. Thus it is in a
position to know quite thoroughly the ability of the mortgagor
to meet its obligations. In spite of the fact of such knowledge,
the trustee is generally not bound to take immediate action since
the indenture commonly stipulates that the trustee shall be con-
clusively presumed to have no knowledge of default until notified
of the existence thereof by a specified percentage of the bond-
holders. It is a rare occasion that bondholders learn of a default
without being so informed by the trustee or by the refusal of the
paying agent to take up matured bonds and coupons. And since
it frequently happens that the latter advances the necessary
money for maturity payments the bondholder's sources of in-
formation are reduced to one, the trustee, which is under no duty
to impart such knowledge. Therefore we are met with the absurd
result that the trustee is conclusively presumed not to know of a
condition which it is usually the first to learn, unless notified by
the bondholders who can usually acquire such knowledge through
the trustee.
While it is no doubt necessary that the trustee have a wide
discretion in determining when to notify,3 9 it is difficult to state
the limits of that discretion. Giving notification of defaults,
which are merely technical in nature and which threaten no
immediate harm, may seriously affect the interests of bondhold-
ers. 0  Usually, there follows such notification a dumping of
tecurities with a concomitant loss to investors; public confidence
declines and the mortgagor's emergence -from what might have
been a temporary difficulty is greatly hampered. Not infre-
quently, use of the trustee's discretion in withholding notifi-
cation of default has served to aid the mortgagor in repairing
E'(f. Anderson v. Pennsylvania Hotel Co., 56 F. (2d) 980 (C. C. A.
Sth, 1932). See S. E. C. Report, Part VI, at 42.
" See S. E. C. Report, Part VI, at 42.
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the conditions which led to default and there is little doubt that
the exercise of this discretion has, in such cases, served as much
a boon to the bondholders as to the mortgagor. The general
immunity clause, commonly found in trust indentures has shield-
ed the trustee and made it more willing to grant such indul-
gences. If the occurrence of the breach or default does not
threaten the integrity of the estate no immediate action on the
part of the trustee is required and, unless there is a demand by
the bondholders, the trustee is not liable if additional defaults
are allowed to pass without action on his part. On the other
hand, the necessity of notice and demand implies that at some
point in the transaction the trustee will come under the duty,
as an incident of its relationship, to notify the bondholders in
order that they may act for their own protection if the trustee
does not.4 1 Such notification forms a part of the general dis-
cretionary powers attributed to the trustee above.
By the usual indenture provisions the trustee is authorized
to take all necessary protective steps upon default. Its inactiv-
ity is, therefore, not due to any lack of power.42 Ordinarily
however, its duty to act is somewhat limited by the indenture
and its obligation is conditioned upon its receipt of the specified
notice of default, demand for action, and indemnity. However,
the obligor's default may occasion the trustee's exercise of
various powers, among them: (1) the authority to declare the
entire principal immediately due and payable upon default;43
,(2) the power to institute foreclosure proceedings;4 4 (3) the
4 ' See Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Guaranty Inv. Co., 213 Wis. 415,
250 N. W. 862 (1933).
42"76 per cent (324 out of 423) of the indentures studied, con-
tained the express provision that the trustee possessed the power to
sue in its own name and to recover the entire principal unpaid, in the
event of default by the issuer in the payment of principal when due,
whether on the due date of the securities or upon their accelerated
maturity. And the more general provision, that on the happening of
these same conditions the trustee could in its own name enforce the
rights under the indenture against the property, was contained in
91 per cent (377 out of 415) of the cases. In all but 5 of these inden-
tures (98 per cent) it was expressly provided that the trustee was
vested with the exclusive power to enforce such rights." S. E. C.
Report, Part VI, at 42.
43 If, however, the trustee is not specifically authorized the power
will not be implied. See Maloney v. Home Bank & Trust Co., 97 Ind.
App. 564, 186 N. E. 897 (1933), mod. 187 N. E. 682 (1933).
" Armour v. Waxahachie Gas Co., 53 F. (2d) 979 (C. C. A. 5th,
1932); Buch v. City Trust Co., 101 Fla. 393, 134 So. 226 (1931). Ordi-
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authority to bid for and purchase the property on foreclosure
on behalf of all the bondholders. 45 As previously pointed out,
however, the strict obligation to exercise each or any of these
powers is avoided by the usual indenture provision and the bur-
den of affirmative action is placed upon the bondholders. What
then are the latter's rights; how can they spur the trustee to
action in their behalf; and what are their remedies in the event
that the trustee fails to heed their request?
MNany corporate bonds contain a clause referring the bond-
holder to the trustee indenture, under which the bonds are
issued for a description of his rights with respect to the bond.46
The purpose of this reference clause is to give the holder notice
of the limitations on his right to sue at law upon the bond or in
equity upon the security. Since these limitations are usually too
numerous to reprint on the bonds themselves they are generally
found only in the indenture, a fact of which, perhaps, a majority
of the bondholders is ignorant. Not infrequently, consequently,
one of the bondholders starts suit in law or in equity and is met
by the proposition that his right to sue is limited by the trust
indenture. 47 At such a stage in the proceeding there arises
narily, of course, it is in the trustee's discretion to determine when it
shall do so. Pearlman & Co. v. Lincoln Belmont Bldg. Corp., 251 Ill.
135 (1929).
' This power is usually expressly provided for in the indenture and
it frequently affords protection against losses consequent upon sale
in a depressed market. See Sage v. Central R. R., 99 U. S. 334, 339
(1878).
" The typical clause reads:
"This bond is one of a duly authorized issue of bonds of the
corporation equally secured by a trust ... to which indenture
reference is hereby made for a description of the property mort-
gaged, the nature and extent of the security and the rights of the
corporation and the trustees and the holders of said bonds in
respect thereto."
'7 The provision with which the bondholder is usually met when
starting suit is as follows:
"the trustee ... upon being requested in writing by the holders of
fifty-one per cent (51 per cent) of the amount of the note then
outstanding hereunder, shall declare ... the notes ... as immedi-
ately due and collectible . . .Every holder of said notes and cou-
pons accepts them subject to the express agreement that unless
and until the trustee shall have declined to act as herein provided
every right of action hereunder by judicial proceedings or other-
wise is vested exclusively in the trustee, and that in no event
except in case of such declination by the trustee, shall any holder
...have any right to institute any suit or proceeding or take
any action hereunder. .
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the interesting question of how far is the bondholder charged
with knowledge of the contents of the indenture.
As to whether or not a bondholder is charged with knowl-
edge of the trust deed provisions there appears to be a decided
split of authority. Many of the decisions of the lower New York
courts have held that reference in a bond to an indenture, by
wvhich it is secured, is insufficient to affect the holder with
knowledge of the contents of the indenture. 48 This line of
opinion is well exemplified in the leading case of Cunningham v.
Pressed Steel Car Co. 4 9 The indenture that was the subject of
consideration in that case provided that no bondholder should
have the right to enforce any terms of the agreement until the
holders of one-fourth in principal amount of the bonds had
requested the trustee to act. The bonds themselves contained a
bare reference to the indenture "for a statement of the rights
of the holders of said bonds." The bonds held by the plaintiff
matured and the company defaulted in its payments. There-
after the plaintiff sued to recover the value of her bonds, with-
out first conforming to the indenture provisions. In allowing
recovery on the bonds the court held that the corporation's
"primary covenant to pay at maturity, contained in the bonds
themselves, is not qualified by the collateral promises and agree-
ments of defendant mentioned in the indenture. The bondholder's
remedy to proceed on the primary obligation is separate and dis-
tinct from the right to enforce the collateral promises of the
indenture. In the bonds before us there is no recital which
expressly conditions defendant's promise to pay at maturity by
the terms of the indenture."
Although the terminology employed in these various ref-
erence clauses has been very diverse, these courts have consis-
tently held that there was no notice.50 The reasons usually
given for this attitude are: (1) If the holder were charged with
notice of the indenture provisions the bond would be rendered
'8 Neivel Realty Corp. v. Prudence Bonds Corp., 151 Misc. 737, 271
N. Y. S. 209 (1934); Lubin v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 146 Misc. 462,
263 N Y. S. 433 (1933); Berman v. Consolidated Nevada-Utah Corp.,
132 Misc. 462, 230 N. Y. S. 421 (1928).
-265 N. Y. S. 256, 238 App. Div. 634 (1933), affd. 263 N. Y. 671,
189 N. E. 750 (1934).
50A few other jurisdictions also adhere to this rule. Thorpe v.
Mindeman, 123 Wis. 149, 101 N. W. 417, 107 Am. St. Rep. 1003, 68
L. R. A. 146 (1904). See also Sturgis Nat. Bank v. Harris Trust &
Say. Bank, 351 Ill. 465, 184 N. E. 589 (1933); Paepeke v. Paine, 253
Mich. 636, 235 N. W. 871 (1931).
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non-negotiable, a result which should be avoided; 51 (2) The
restrictions in the indenture are inconsistent with the uncon-
ditional promise to pay to be found in the bond. Any such
inconsistency must be construed in favor of the holder since he
relies on the wording in the bond when making his purchase ;52
(3) The reference imports only a limitation upon the holder's
right to sue upon the indenture and none upon his right to sue
upon his bond.
5 3
An opposing view of this situation is taken by the federal
courts, which uniformly hold that bondholders are charged with
notice of all the terms of the trust indenture, under which the
bonds were issued, where the bonds are referred to this inden-
ture for the conditions of issuance and the rights of the hol-
ders.54 Probably a majority of the courts, both state and feder-
al, adhere to this view.
Distinctions may, of course, be drawn between these two
groups of cases. It may be argued that all references are not
alike. However, there are instances where courts have refused
to charge the bondholder with notice even when the reference
was full and complete5 5 and, on the other hand, there are many
cases where courts have charged the bondholder with notice in
spite of the fact that the reference was ambiguous. 56  For this
r 1 Cunningham v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 265 N. Y. S. 256, 238 App.
Div. 634 (1933). But see 41 Yale L. J. 312 at 313 (1931).
0 Lubin v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 146 Misc. 462, 263 N. Y. S. 433
(1933); Berman v. Consolidated Nevada-Utah Corp. 132 Misc. 462,
230 N. Y. S. 421 (1928).
0 Brown v. Michigan Ry., 124 Misc. 630, 207 N. Y. S. 630 (1924);
General Inv. Co. v. Int. Rapid Transit, 200 App. Div. 74, 193 N. Y. S.
903 (1922).
" McAdoo v. Oregon City Mfg. Co., 71 F. (2d) 879 (C. C. A. 9th,
1934); Craig v. Consolidated Cement Corp., 69 F. (2d) 613 (C. C. A.
10th, 1934); Home Mtg. Co. v. Ramsey, 49 F. (2d) 738 (C. C. A. 4th,
1931); Harvey v. Ill. Power & Light Corp., 3 F. Supp. 489 (D. C. E. D.
Ill., 1933).
35 See Brown v. Michigan R. Co., 124 Misc. 630, 207 N. Y. S. 630
(1924), where the reference clause reads "to which mortgage refer-
ence is hereby made for a description of the property mortgaged and
pledged, the nature and extent of the security and the rights of the
company and the trustees and the holders of the said bonds in respect
thereto. In case of default by the company, as set forth in the said
mortgage, the principal of all the said bonds may be declared, or may
become, due and payable in the manner and with the effect provided
In the said mortgage."
"See St. Louis-Carterville Coal Co. v. Southern Coal Mining Co.,
194 Mo. App. 598, 186 S. W. 1152 (1916), where the reference in the
coupon was that the coupon represented "interest due on the corpora-
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reason it would seem unprofitable to attempt at drawing subtle
distinctions since the courts are unwilling to do so.
There is much to be said for the policy of charging the
bondholders with notice of the indenture provisions even in those
instances where the reference is slight and incomplete. Such a
rule prohibits one or a few disgruntled holders from starting
trouble when the majority and the trustee see no reason for
such action. A multiplicity of suits is also avoided thereby.
These are undoubtedly the reasons back of the so-called federal
rule. On the other hand, it would seem that since the small
investor is probably the best customer of bond issues and does
not have ready access, actually, to the indenture itself, the better
rule would protect this type of investor by requiring a reason-
ably full and complete statement on the face of the bond itself
as to the limitations on his rights under the indenture. Since
the small investor generally must rely on the provisions in the
bond when making the purchase, such a rule would be only in
keeping with principles of fair dealing and honesty which the
modern instruments of finance must embrace if they wish to
retain public confidence.
Assuming the majority rule to be that the bondholder is
charged with notice of the contents of the indenture we are met
with the question as to what extent he is bound by the indenture
provisions. Drafters of indentures commonly insert a provision
limiting the right of minority bondholders to take action in the
event of default under the mortgage. These provisions usually
require that before individual action can be taken the trustee
must first have been requested by a specified percentage of the
bondholders to act in their behalf after default.57 Excuse for
such provisions is found in the desire to avoid overwhelming
tion's first mortgage 5 per cent. gold bond note No. 813." This was
held sufficient to charge the holder with notice of the contents of the
mortgage.
5 A typical restrictive clause appears at note 47, supra. The per-
centage of bondholders required to unite in requesting the trustee to
act varies considerably. By far the greater number of indentures
require 25 per cent. Munch v. Central West Public Service Co., 259
N. W. 736 (Neb. 1935); Rittenhouse v. Lukens Steels Co., 176 Atl.
543, 116 Pa. Super. 303 (1935); Republic Supply Co. of Calif. v. Rich-
field Oil Co., 4 F. Supp. 153 (1932). But see Frobisher v. Tudor Corp.,
169 Atl. 855, 114 N. J. Eq. 470 (1933), where the number required was
51 per cent.; Holl v. Levin, 273 Ill. App. 514 (1934), where the required
number was 20 per cent.
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the debtor by a multiplicity of suits and to insure that course
of action, with respect to the property of the debtor, which will
best serve the interests of all the bondholders as a class. Such
a provision would, of course, lose its utility in the event that all
the bonds became concentrated in the hands of a single indi-
vidual, an event which, however, is not likely to happen except
where the issue is comparatively small. Mluch can be said for
the efficacy of such provisions, especially in times of financial
stress, for with a little cooperation between the majority bond-
holders and the company both the interests of the majority and
of the minority may not infrequently be preserved whereas hasty
action might precipitate disaster for all.
With a view to the typical reference clause of the bond
directing the holder to the indenture for a description of the
security and his rights with respect to it,58 the cases leave no
doubt that a bondholder cannot institute a foreclosure action
until there has been a strict compliance with the requirements
of the indenture and wrongful refusal of the trustee to act after
it has been duly requested by the specified number of bond-
holders.5 9 Nor may the bondholder sue for the appointment of
a receiver of the mortgaged premises; 60 nor, in the absence of
express authority to that effect, may he accelerate the principal.0 1
Unless there is an express provision to the contrary the
right of the holder to sue at law on the obligation at maturity
remains unimpaired. 62 However, this right to sue on the matured
bond, as well as on the matured coupons, is frequently restricted
by provisions in the indenture which are referred to by
1 Halle v. Van Sweringer Corp., 185 Atl. 236 (Del. Super. Ct., 1936);
Sturgis Nat. Bank v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 351 Ill. 465, 184
N. E. 589 (1933); Schatzkis v. Rosenwald & Weil, 267 Ill. App. 169
(1932).
"'Rodman v. Richfield Oil Co., 66 F. (2d) 244 (1933); Craig v.
Consolidated Cement Corp., 69 F. (2d) 613 (1934); Rabenwold v. Asso-
ciated Gas & Electric Co., 266 N. Y. S. 520, 148 Misc. 507 (1933); Levy
v. Paramount Publix Corp., 266 N. Y. S. 271, 149 Misc. 129 (1933);
ci., Townsend v. Milaca Motor Co., 194 Minn, 423, 260 N. W. 525 (1935).
-" Home Mtg. Co. v. Ramsey, 49 F. (2d) 738 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931),
revg. 47 F. (2d) 621 (E. D. N. C. 1931); Central West Public Service
Co. v. Craig, 70 F. (2d) 427 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); cf. Ernst v. Film Pro-
duction Corp., 148 Misc. 62, 264 N. Y. S. 227 (1933).
6I Munch v. Central West Public Service Co., 128 Neb. 645, 259
N. W. 736 (1935); cf. Brooks v. Flatbush Ave. and Nevins St. Corp,
146 Misc. 683, 262 N. Y. S. 597 (1932).
'See note, 41 Yale L. J. 312 (1931).
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language in the bond. Such references are generally strictly
construed and must be explicit. The reasons for this careful
scrutiny being that discussed heretofore, namely, a desire to
avoid qualification of the bond's unconditional promise to pay.
3
The percentage of bondholders required by the indenture
to unite in requesting action by the trustee varies widely. The
usual indenture provides for 25 per cent.0 4 It would seem that
in the few cases where the percentage required, as a condition
precedent to the right of bondholders to foreclose, were so large
as to render the procedure unavailing the courts would hold
that such a requirement resulted in an ouster of jurisdiction.
What maximum percentage the courts will sustain is a matter of
conjecture. Perhaps even so low a percentage requirement as
a majority might be held impracticable by reason of the present
wide distribution of securities and in fact there are dicta to that
effect. 65 But since the majority of indentures require only a
25 per cent request it is probable that the courts will continue
to hold that the desirability of preventing injurious action by a
minority far outweighs considerations of threatened obstruction
of rights of individual holders.66
If it can be said that one essential idea pervades all of the
varying decisions it would seem to be an ever increasing desire
to protect the majority bondholders. At the same time, there is
plenty of evidence of the court's tendency to zealously protect
its jurisdiction. In general, the decisions indicate that the
courts will uphold any reasonable provision insofar as it works
no hardship on the minority.
Where the bondholder seeks to take action intended to pre-
vent the impairment of the security, restrictive provisions in
the trust indenture obviously do not apply. In such a case
action lies directly against the corporation, or against the trustee,
or both, as where the holder seeks to enjoin the issuance of
additional bonds which would have impaired security already
inadequate; or to restrain the obligor from disposing of assets;
13 See cases note 58, supra.
1 Note 57, supra.
,,See Brown v. Denver Omnibus & Cab Co., 254 Fed. 560, 569
(C. C. A. 8th, 1918); of. Lowenthal v. Georgia Coast and Piedmont
R. R., 233 Fed. 1010, 1012 (S. D. Ga. 1916).
1 See Home Mortgage Co. v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., 52 Minn.
148, 53 N. W. 1134 (1893).
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or to enjoin threatened damage to the security. Also, courts
have permitted the enjoining of a sale of property at the suit
of the trustee in order that bondholder groups might intervene
and object to proposed reorganization plans.
A recent decision suggests removal of the trustee as a pre-
ventative remedy available to bondholders. In that case, Florida
National Bank v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co.,0 7 the suit of
individual bondholders for foreclosure was dismissed for failure
of the required percentage to request action by the trustee, in
spite of an allegation to the effect that the trustee had been
faithless to his trust and had conspired to favor certain bond-
holders. Generally the decisions have required a greater degree
of misconduct in such cases than is usual for like remedies but
the court in the Florida Bank case stated that for the trustee's
unjust neglect or refusal to take appropriate action a proceeding
for ouster would lie.
Removal of the trustee is usually grounded on willful dis-
regard of fiduciary duty68 and it has been held that conflicting
or adverse interests are sufficient evidence of such a breach of
trust.69 However, the mere fact that the trustee's conduct may
injure bondholders, in the absence of a direct violation of the
trust obligation, will not be ground for such a removal.70
Additional remedies available to the bondholder are those
seeking recovery for injuries already afflicted. Usually such suits
seek monetary compensation but frequently they direct them-
selves toward a specific recovery. For instance, in one case a
bondholder was permitted to follow and impress a lien upon
security sold in bad faith by the trustee.7 1 However, by far the
larger number of actions seek monetary recovery, and it is such
actions which are limited by the general exculpatory clauses,
that all too often prevent recovery. On the other hand the right
to intervene, the right to restrain, even the right to oust the
trustee, all preventative in nature, afford no room for appli-
cation of the immunity clauses and would seem to be the remedies
Cl 123 Fla. 525, 167 So. 378 (1936).
06 See In the Matter of Mechanic's Bank, 2 Barb. 466 (N. Y. 1848);
Harrison v. Union Trust Co., 144 N. Y. 326, 39 N. E. 353 (1895).
' Myers v. American National Bank & Trust Co., 277 Il. App. 378
(1934)
oBergelt v. Roberts, 236 App. Div. 777, 258 N. Y. S. 1086 (1932).
Campbell v. Anthony, 112 Fed. 212 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901).
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most available to bondhoiders. Generally speaking, the bond-
holder can intervene when there is a possibility that his interests
will not be properly served by the trustee. Thus, intervention
will be allowed where the trustee represents conflicting inter-
ests.7 2 Also the possibility of favor to one group at the
expense of another may ground a right to intervene.7 3 But the
mere fact that the trustee advocates a plan of reorganization




Another result of the trustee's failure to notify the bond-
holders of a default may be occasioned where the trustee seeks
reimbursement for advancements it has made upon the mort-
gagor's default. Such a problem arises when the trustee claims
for advances a lien prior to or equal with that of the mortgage
bondholders. The latter's rights are of course impaired to the
extent that the trustee's claim is recognized. Mlost of the cases
concerning such claims are occasioned by the trustee's advances
for taxes and insurance. Since nearly every trust indenture
places upon the trustee the burden of protecting the security it
must constantly be on its guard in order to see that the mort-
gagor promptly pays the insurance premiums and various tax
assessments on the property. Total or partial destruction of the
mortgaged property, if uninsured, or the interposition of a prior
lien for unpaid taxes, assessments, ground rents, necessary re-
pairs, and the like, may menace the protective value of the secu-
rity. Most indentures, therefore, either expressly or impliedly
empower the trustee to take appropriate steps in such cases to
preserve the value of the security.75 For expenditures, thus
incurred the trustee is entitled to reimbursement.7 0 Whether,
' Guaranty Trust Co. v. Atlantic Coast Electric Ry., 138 Fed. 517
(C. C. A. 3d, 1905); Farmer's L. & T. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 66 Fed.
169 (E. D. Wis., 1895)
11 Clinton Trust Co v. 142-144 Joralemon St. Corp., 237 App. Div.
789, 263 N. Y. S. 359 (2d Dept., 1933).
"Bergelt v. Roberts, supra note 70.
' E. g., Hadley Bros.-Uhl Co. v. Scott, 93 S. W. (2d) 276 (Mo. App.,
1936); Fleener v. Omaha National Co., 267 N. W. 462 (Neb., 1936);
Smith v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 116 Fla. 390, 156 So. 498
(1934); McManus v. Temple Estate Co., 10 Cal. App. (2d) 419, 51 Pac.
(2d) 1124 (1935).
' Reimbursement is usually assured by permitting the trustee a
lien prior to or co-extensive with that of the mortgage. Hadley Bros.-
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however, a particular expenditure is an expenditure necessary to
protect the security is sometimes doubtful,7 7 although it is clear
that the trustee's advances for taxes and insurance are within
this category.7s
The usual indenture expressly authorizes advances by the
trustee upon failure of the obligor to pay taxes and insurance
with the right of the trustee to a lien therefor. However, two
recent cases handed down by the same court indicate that even
where the trust indenture is strictly complied with the trustee
may find itself an unsecured creditor of the mortgagor. In
ilarshall & sley Bank v. Guaranty Inv. Go."9 the defendant,
to secure a bond issue, executed a deed of trust which gave the
trustee the right, but did not impose the duty, to advance money
for the payment of taxes and ground rents. For such advances
the trustee was to have a first lien prior to the lien of the trust
deed. The trustee advanced various sums without notifying the
bondholders of the mortgagor's failure to pay. The trustee then
became bankrupt and its trustee in bankruptcy claimed a lien
for the advances. In a foreclosure suit brought by the successor
trustee the court held that since the prior lien created an adverse
interest in the trustee, it was a violation of fiduciary duty
to continue the advances without giving reasonable prompt
notice to the bondholders of the impairment of their security.
The same court on the same day handed down the decision
in Marshall & l1sley Bank v. Hackett, Hoff and Thiermann.80
In that case the same corporation was also trustee under a simi-
lar trust deed executed by a different mortgagor. This deed
Uhl Co. v. Scott, 93 S. W. (2d) 276 (Mo. App., 1936). However, it
has been held that for advances made to pay taxes the trustee is sub-
rogated to the prior lien of the taxing authority. American Security
& Trust Co. v. Hardee, 77 F. (2d) 382 (App. D. C., 1935).
17Where it is sought to apply sinking fund payments to the dis-
charge of taxes in order to preserve the security, it has been held that
to do so would be a conversion, and that the trustee could not be com-
pelled to make such advances even in order to preserve security, the
value of which is speculative, at the expense of security whose value
is certain. First Union Trust & Savings Bank v. Bernardin, 60 F. (2d)
419 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932).
18First Trust Co. of Lincoln, Neb. v. Ricketts, 75 F. (2d) 309
(C. C. A. 8th, 1934); New York Trust Co. v. Michigan Traction Co.,
193 Fed. 175 (W. D. Mich., 1912); Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Hackett,
Hoff & Thierman, 213 Wis. 426, 250 N. W. 866 (1933).
" 213 Wis. 415, 250 N. W. 862 (1933).
8213 Wis. 426, 250 N. W. 866 (1933).
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stipulated that the trustee should have a lien for sums advanced
to pay taxes and insurance, but the lien was to be on a parity
with, instead of prior to, that of the bondholders. The relation-
ship and conduct of the parties were in all material respects the
same as in the previous case. The court held that since the lien
on a parity with the bondholder's lien did not set up an adverse
interest, the advances were beneficial to the bondholders and
the lien was properly allowed. "The trustee could gain no
rights superior to theirs (the bondholders) by such advance-
ments as it made. The bondholders could lose no security by
reason of the trustee's advancements."81
Theoretically the cases cannot be reconciled. There seems
to be only a difference in degree between the adverse interests
created by a prior lien and by a lien on a parity. The creation of
a lien, whether equal or prior to that of the mortgage, has the
practical effect of lulling the bondholders into a sense of security
in the belief that the corporation is successfully meeting its
obligation, thus preventing them, until too late, from taking
protective action.
8 2
The duty to notify,, as defined in the Guaranty Investment
case, has previously been imposed under similar circumstances
where the advances were apparently motivated by considerations
other than the beneficiaries' interest.8 3 On the other hand,
trustees for bondholders have occasionally been awarded a prior
lien for advances, on the theory that they have acted fr the
benefit of the beneficiaries.8 Such advances, in themselves,
are not pernicious and do not necessarily imperil the bond-
holder's security; usually they are of protective importance.
The harm ensues, however, when the disability of the trustee to
recover arises from the concealment of such advances for so
unreasonable a length of time as to create an impairment of the
security against which the bondholders, without notice, are
unable to protect themselves. Therefore, the cases have implied
"Id., at 869.
82Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Guaranty Inv. Co., 213 Wis. 415, 425,
250 N. W. 862, 866 (1933). But ef. First Trust Co. of Lincoln, Neb. v.
Ricketts, 75 F. (2d) 309 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934).
13Wright v. Chandler, 180 Ill. App. 476 (1913); of. Bush v. Froe-
lich, 14 S. D. 62, 84 N. W. 230 (1900).
5Hallett v. Moore, 185 N. E. 474 (Mass., 1933).
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a duty to give notice.85 Since the trustee has actually made
advances it is required, by good faith, to give notice within a
reasonable time.
A much more difficult problem arises where the trustee
volunteers funds to meet principal and interest payments. It
is a rare indenture which authorizes such advances; nevertheless,
there has been brought to light by the S. E. C. investigations
the fact that such advances are made much more frequently than
has formerly been supposed and they played an important role
in the breakdown of many of the larger and better known bond
issues during the recent depression. It was learned that more
than frequently, especially in the case of bond issues secured by
real estate mortgages, the houses of issue succeeded in having
an affiliate or subordinate selected as trustee or fiscal agent for
the issue and in that way were in close touch with all operations
incidental thereto.8 6 In the event the mortgagor was unable
to meet interest or principal payments it was customary for
the house of issue, through the trustee or fiscal agent, to advance
the necessary funds and to accept the maturing coupons or
bonds, as the case might be, as security8 7 At the earlier stage
of these operations it was customary to subordinate such claims
to those of the bondholders, the house of issue believing the
defaults to be only temporary. Later, however, when it was
possible to know definitely that the obligor had little chance of
paying off its obligations without a foreclosure, the houses cus-
tomarily insisted on their claims being given recognition on a
This duty has been compared with an agent's duty to fully inform
his principal of all facts material to the protection of the principal's
Interests and which are within the scope of the agency. First Trust
Co. of Lincoln, Neb. v. Carlsen, 129 Neb. 118, 122, 261 N. W. 333, 336
(1935). The trustee's power to make advances has not, however, been
transformed into a duty. Cf. Smith v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 116 Fla. 390, 156 So. 498 (1934). And the trustee can neither be
compelled to use its own funds for this purpose, First Union T. & S.
Bank v. Bernardin, 60 F. (2d) 419, 425 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932), nor to
use moneys in its hands representing sinking fund payments or funds
otherwise held by it as security. Ibid.
1 See S. E. C. Report, Part III, at page 12.
6
71d. at 22. A striking instance of the vast sums advanced may be
found in the following language: "Considering the three largest
houses of issue we find that from November 1, 1927, to February 11,
1931, when it ceased this policy, S. W. Straus & Co. had outstanding
advancements of almost $3,000,000 on 65 of the issues underwritten by
its Illinois branch. In New York it advanced approximately $4,300,000
after January 1, 1928, on 62 issues; in California approximately $415,000
on 22 issues." S. E. C. Report, Part III, at page 23.
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parity with those of the bondholders. Hesitating, no doubt,
because of the scarcity of precedent on the subject, or because
of identity of interest with the house of issue, those representing
the bondholders frequently compromised these claims and
allowed the underwriters an amount in substantial accord with
that originally demanded, 8 thus impairing the security of the
bondholders to that extent. It is my opinion, that a careful
analysis of the decisions on the same and similar sets of facts
would have warranted those, who patently were interested in
protecting the rights of the bondholders, in resisting all such
claims and saving that much more of the security for payment of
bondholder claims on foreclosure.
Although the cases on this subject are comparatively few
they seem to emphatically indicate that a majority of the courts
look with disfavor on advancements for interest and principal
by the trustee. One of the earliest cases, and the one most fre-
quently relied upon by those who would allow reimbursement for
trustee advances, is Ketchum v. Duncan. 9  In that case the
mortgagor railroad was unable to meet interest payments and its
financial agent agreed to take up the coupons. Instead of pay-
ing the coupons at its office, however, as had been done in the
past, the railroad simply verified them when presented and sent
the holders to a certain bank which paid the coupons, turned
them over to the financial agent, and was reimbursed. The
financial agent later claimed reimbursement privileges and a
dispute in court centered about the question of whether the
mortgage deed was a valid security, not only for bonds and
coupons outstanding in the hands of the original bondholders,
but also for those coupons in the hands of the financial agent.
The court reasoned that the answer depended on whether these
8 In one such case it was agreed that 75 per cent of the disputed
securities should be recognized on a parity and 25 per cent would be
subordinated. See S. E. C. Report, Part III, at page 112.
-96 U. S. 659, 24 L. Ed. 868 (1878). An earlier case, but one
which has since not been cited to any great extent, is The Union
Trust Co. of New York v. The Monticello & Port Jervis Ry. Co., 63
N. Y. 311 (1875). In that case interest coupons upon the bonds of the
railroad were received by one who, by agreement with the railroad
advanced the money with which they were taken up under an agree-
ment that they were to be delivered to him uncanceled as security for
the advances. Held, that as against the corporation they were valid
securities but must be subordinated as against the securities held by
the bondholders.
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coupons were paid or purchased and concluded that they had
been purchased, not paid. It assumed that the holders must
have known that the bank would hold the coupons as claims
against the railroad because the latter had not followed the
usual course of paying them, and, of course, having reimbursed
the railroad the financial agent succeeded to all of the latter's
rights. Although it is true that there could not be a sale unless
both parties consented, the court implied that assent from the
fact that the bondholders were put on notice by the fact that
the usual method of paying matured coupons was not followed
in the case of the coupons at issue. A previous case, 90 which
involved identical facts, with the exception that there the usual
method of payment was followed, had reached a contrary result
but the court in the Ketchwnv case took pains to distinguish the
two on the ground that in the one there was an intention,
implied of course, 9 ' of the parties to effect a sale, while in the
others the coupons were canceled, and paid.
The next case on this point that attracted the attention of
the Supreme Court was Wood v. Guaranty Trust & Safe Deposit
(o.92 The facts there, while not identical, were similar to those
in the Ketchurn case and it is interesting to note that the court
reached a different result. In the Wood case the obligor had
issued bonds and upon their maturity had paid some of them.
These it turned over to a third person to cover certain advances
which the latter had made for the obligor's benefit. When it was
sought to put these bonds on a basis prior to that of other out-
standing bonds the court held that the transferee stood in no
better shoes than the transferor and that since the latter could
have no preference over outstanding bonds then the transferee
had no such rights. The Ketchum case was distinguished on the
ground that whereas in that case there was a clear purchase with
no intention of retiring the bonds, here the bondholders were led
Ibid.
"Aiding the courts in implying this intention was the fact that
many of the bondholders had actual notice of the fact that the financial
agent was buying up the coupons, they having made inquiries as to
that fact and had been so informed. Ketchum v. Duncan, 96 U. S. 659
at 663 (1878).
"128 U. S. 416, 32 L. Ed. 472 (1888).
K. L. J.-3
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to believe that bonds which they turned in were paid and would
be canceled. 93
In Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Iowa Water Co.,94 the
obligor had issued bonds secured by a mortgage under the
terms of which the coupons were a lien prior to the principal.
Before the maturity date of the first set of coupons, the obligor
remitted to the trust company, at whose offices they were pay-
able a sum less than the whole amount of the maturing coupons.
On the day the coupons matured, one Venner, who was under no
legal obligation to do so, but who wished to prevent a public
default on the bonds, agreed with the trust company that it
should buy, for his account, any coupons presented which it
had no funds to pay. Accordingly the trust company turned
over to Venner 93 coupons and received from him the money for
them. There was no notice, actual or constructive, to the bond-
holders of these transactions but they simply presented for col-
lection their coupons at the place where they were to be paid
upon presentation and cancellation and the coupons were appar-
ently paid. The coupons received by Venner were transferred
by him, for value, to a corporation of which he was director
which afterwards, in a foreclosure suit, presented the coupons
and claimed a preference for them. It was held that as against
the bondholders neither Venner nor his transferee could be
purchasers of the coupons, or entitled to preference over the
bonds, but the coupons must be treated as paid.95
The doctrine laid down in the Keteh~im case, to the effect
that if the usual mode of payment was varied the bondholders
were put on notice of the fact that a purchase and not a payment
was intended, was departed from in the case of Baker v. Meloy.96
I None of the bondholders, as in the Ketchum case, had actual
notice of the intention on the part of the third person to purchase
and not merely pay the bonds. In addition, in the Wood case the
coupons had been canceled, when paid by the obligor; all had been
"punctured and defaced by mucilage" and about one-half of them had
the word "paid" across them. Id. at page 424. From these facts it
was quite easy for the court to reason that any person, into whose
possession these coupons might later come, would have ample notice
of the fact that they had been paid and were no longer outstanding.
Cf. Pearce v. Bryant Coal Co., 121 Ill. 590 (1887).
-'78 Fed. 881 (1897).
OsAccord: United Waterworks Co. v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co.,
82 Fed. 144 (1897); Venner v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 90 Fed. 348
(1898).
95 Md. 1, 51 Atl. 893 (1902).
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In that ease it was found that on foreclosure of a mortgage
securing certain bonds the proceeds were insufficient to pay the
entire debt. The holder of certain of the bonds had purchased
them after past-due coupons had been detached, believing that
they had been paid, and excepted to the auditor's account allow-
ing the holder of the detached coupons to participate pro rata
with the bondholders in the proceeds of the foreclosure sale.
The coupons had been paid by a method different from the cus-
tomary one, the holders receiving checks on the financial agent
instead of the obligor, as had theretofore been customary, but
it appeared conclusively that there was no actual notice to the
bondholders of an intention not to pay the bonds. The court
held that as between the holders of the bonds and coupons,
respectively, the coupons were paid and could not participate in
the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. It went on to say that the
mere fact that the bonds were paid in a mode different from the
one usually resorted to did not put the holders upon inquiry
and could have no bearing on the decision.9 7
In Louisville Title Company's Bee. v. Crab Orchard Bank-
ing Co. 5 a title company had issued and guaranteed first mort-
gage bonds. It was trustee for the purpose of receiving sinking
fund payments and holding mortgages and in addition it was
also the holder of some of the bonds. The title company became
insolvent and its receiver sought to place the bonds which it
held on a parity, under the mortgage, with other outstanding
bonds. His claim was disallowed, the court holding that before
the trustee's claim could be satisfied the bonds outstanding must
first be paid in full. In reaching its decision, subordinating the
bonds in the hands of the trustee, the court reasoned on the
analogy of a mortgagee selling a portion of the purchase money
notes, which he has obtained from the mortgagor, and retaining
7, "While the circumstances ... were calculated to put the holders
off their guard in making their transactions with" the financial agent
"they, on the other hand, imposed a duty on the latter of more frank-
ness in dealing with the holders than the evidence shows they
observed; and they should not be permitted by their mere silence,
when there was good reason for them to believe that such silence
was deceptive, to entrap the holders who presented their coupons into
making a sale to their prejudice and contrary to their actual intent."
Id., 51 Atl. at 896.
"9249 Ky. 736, 61 S. W. (2d) 615 (1933).
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the rest. In such a case the claims of the assignees clearly take
precedence over those of the assignor.99
In the case of First Trust Co. of Lincoln v. Ricketts, °0 0 the
obligor had given a mortgage to the trust company along with
notes and bonds. The latter sold the bonds. Under the mort-
gage the trust company was designated trustee and paying agent
and was permitted to advance funds for taxes and insurance
with the right of indemnity. It was also given the power to
foreclose on default. The obligor defaulted in sinking fund
payments and the trust company made advances for interest and
principal and took up bonds and coupons. It also paid insurance
premiums and taxes out of its own funds. Bondholders were
never notified of these advancements. On foreclosure, the trustee
seeks a parity basis for its bonds and coupons. The court allowed
the claim for reimbursement for the advancement for insur-
ance and taxes on the ground that the indenture expressly
authorized the advancements without a duty to inform the
bondholders. As to those coupons and bonds held as security
for interest and principal advancements, however, the court
held that they had been paid and not purchased since no evi-
dence was shown that bondholders ever intended selling their
coupons to the trustee. "The coupons were presented to the
proper person, in the proper way, and at the proper time and
place, for payment, and were paid in exactly the same manner
that they would have been paid had the borrower, instead of the
trustee, furnished the money .... In absence of circumstances
. .. indicating that the bondholders were charged with knowl-
edge that their coupons were being purchased, it is held that
the coupons have been paid and extinguished and not pur-
chased.' 0 1 Thus the court seems, by way of dicta, to give effect
to the decision in Ketchum v. Duncan. The indication is that if
any act, such as payment of the coupons at other than the usual
time or place, were done by the trustee, that should put the
holder on inquiry, a different decision would be reached and the
coupons held to have been purchased.
91 Meriwether v. New Orleans Real Estate Bd., 162 So. 208, 182 La.
649 (1935); Georgia Realty Co. v. Bank of Covington, 91 S. E. 267,
19 Ga. App. 219 (1917); Lawson v. Warren, 124 Pac. 46, 34 Okla. 94
(1912); Kuppenheimer v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 163 fI1. App.
127 (1911).
S75 F. (2d) 309 (1934).
I. at 312.
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The most recent important case on this subject is Lake
View Trust & Say. Bank v. Rice.1 0 2 In that case the first trust
company, which was trustee under a trust deed securing a bond
issue, sold practically the entire issue to a second trust company
and the latter, acting for customers to whom it resold the bonds,
presented the bonds and interest coupons to the first trust
company for payment. They were duly paid and canceled,
except as to certain bonds and coupons which the first trust
company took up with its own funds and, instead of canceling
them, retained as its own, without the knowledge or consent of
the second trust company or the persons for whom the latter
was collecting. In a suit to foreclose the lien of the trust deed
the first trust company seeks to have its bonds and coupons
placed on a parity with the others. Holding that the first trust
company was a mere volunteer, the court refused its claim and
stressed the fact that the advance, which was made by the trust
company, was not ratified by the other bondholders. "One who
advances money to pay the debt of another, in the absence of an
express or implied agreement for subrogation, is not entitled to
succeed to the rights and remedies of creditors so paid unless
there is some obligation, interest, or right, legal or equitable,
changing the status from that of mere volunteer."
It would seem, from this review of the most important cases,
that the courts are reluctant to give the trustee a lien on a parity
with or superior to that of the bondholders for its advance-
ments.10 3 It is true that in those cases where the evidence
strongly indicated an intention on the part of the trustee to not
merely pay the maturing bonds and coupons but to purchase
them for its own use the courts have allowed it a lien when that
fact was coupled with notice on the part of the bondholders of
such an intention.' 0 4 However, something more than construe-
1F2 79 Ill. App. 538 (1935).
"I See also Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co. v. Kansas Tel. Co.,
8 F. Supp. 287 (1934); Morton Trust Co. v. Home Tel. Co., 66 N. J.
Eq. 106, 57 Atl. 1020 (1904); Bennett v. Chandler, 199 Ill. 97 (1902).
'S-upra note 89. Accord: Anderson v. Penn. Hotel Co., 56 F.
(2d) 980 (1932). In that case, however, the mortgage itself gave the
trustee permission "to buy, sell, hold, own or deal in any of the bonds
or coupons issued hereunder and secured by this mortgage." Id. at
981. Of. Security Trust Co. v. American Inv. Co., 34 N. M. 551, 286
Pac. 159 (1930), where it was held that even though the assignee
[bondholder] did have knowledge that interest payments were being
advanced it would not be vital.
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
tive notice should be proven and it is submitted that only where
actual notice of the bondholder is proved should such lien be
allowed. Especially should this be the test in view of the fact
that such advances are neither commonly authorized by the
indenture nor related to the protection of the security. When
notice of the obligor's default has not been given and bondhold-
ers receive payments of principal or interest in the usual man-
ner so that there is nothing to characterize them as advances
by the trustee rather than as required payments by the obligor
there seems to be no reason for any decision other than one hold-
ing that as to the extent of such advances the trustee is simply
an unsecured creditor of the obligor. An additional factor
which has aided the courts in reaching such a result is the fact
that the very making of the advances has prevented the holders
from acquiring knowledge of default which might have enabled
them to take steps toward protecting the security.10 5
Tim GENERAL ImmUNiTY CLAuSE
We have seen that the modern corporate trust deed is some-
what different from the private trust. Certainly, however, the
trustee under the corporate indenture, like any trustee, owes
to all parties concerned the duty of acting in good faith and of
using care in the performance of its duties as trustee.' 00 It has
become the customary procedure, however, for the trustee to
insist that drafters of the indentures insert provisions modifying
these obligations. Consequently, the ordinary trust deed is filled
with negatives. Whenever a power has been conferred the
draftsman hastens to add "but the trustee shall be under no
duty to do so." At every point an effort is made to delimit the
trustee's obligation by negativing liability for every covenant
and duty, implied or expressed. To what extent are such
exculpatory clauses valid?
Normally the trustee would be held to a standard of ordi-
nary care in the performance of its duties under the inden-
10 Where a default is concealed, through failure of the trustee to
notify bondholders of advancements, the trustee is liable for resulting
damage. First Trust Co. of Lincoln, Neb. v. Carlsen, 261 N. W. 333
(Neb., 1935). But see Connell v. KauKauna Gas, Electric Light &
Power Co., 159 N. W. 927, 164 Wis. 471 (1916).10 Speers Sand and Clay Works v. American Trust Co., 20 F. (2d)
333 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927); Polhemus v. Holland Trust Co., 61 N. J. Eq.
654, 47 Atl. 417 (1900).
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ture.'07 However, the inclusion of the general exculpatory
clause, to the effect that the trustee shall be liable only for "gross
negligence or willful default," establishes a different standard
of care and has been the chief concern of courts dealing with
questions of the trustee's exemption from liability. The diffi-
culty in defining gross negligence is only enhanced by the diffi-
culty in defining ordinary negligence but obviously the former
looks toward a less exacting standard of care than that of the
prudent man. The standard is not a precise one and varies with
the ideas of courts and juries. Gross negligence has been described
as an act or omission to act characterized by "reckless-
ness, "18 "indifference,, "0 "reckless indifference," 110 "supine
negligence,"" ' "willful neglect,""i 12 or "willful passivity.""113
At most the term gross negligence denotes some action middle-
way between ordinary negligence and intentional harm. There
would appear to be an element of willfulness in gross negligence,
a course of action so negligent as to indicate an intention to
harm.
One of the most important cases on this point and one
which emphasizes the importance of the element of willfulness
is Browning v. Fidelity Trust Company."i4 In the trust iden-
ture which was there involved the trustee was authorized to
release security "while there shall be no existing default to
the knowledge of the trustee in respect to the payment of the
principal or interest." In spite of the fact that its banking
201 See Patterson v. Guardian Trust Co., 144 App. Div. 863, 867,
129 N. Y. S. 807 (1911); Miles v. Vivian, 79 Fed. 848 (C. C. A. 2d,
1897); Marshall & Ilsley Bank v. Guaranty Inv. Co., 213 Wis. 415, 423,
250 N. W. 862, 865 (1933).
1" See Hazzard v. Chase National Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 70, 287
N. Y. S. 541, 555 (1936).
""See Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 Fed, 321, 327 (C. C. A.
3d, 1918).
"See Hazzard v. Chase Nat. Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 70, 287 N. Y. S.
541, 555 (1936); Restatement, Trusts (1935), § 222, comment A. See
also Restatement, Torts (1934), §§ 500, 282.
1u1 Kitchen Bros Hotel Co. v. Omaha Safe Deposit Co., 126 Neb. 744,
754, 254 N. W. 507, 512 (1934); Strauss v. Chicago T. & T. Co., 273 Ill.
App. 63, 71 (1933).
u2 See Starr v. Chase National Bank, N. Y. L. J., Sept. 21, 1936,
p. 771, col. 6 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.).
"'Hazard v. Chase National Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 70, 207 N. Y. S.
541, 555 (1936).
-1 250 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918).
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department was aware of two separate interest defaults, the
trustee did release. The exculpatory clause read that the trustee
was not to be "answerable or accountable in any circumstances
whatsoever except for bad faith." The court held that the trustee
was not guilty of gross negligence and was "relieved from lia-
bility by the broad but valid terms of the immunity clause."
Thus in effect it was held that in view of the exculpatory clause,
imputed knowledge was an insufficient basis for liability on the
ground of gross negligence. The court went further and
remarked" 5 that corporate trustees cannot consider their depart-
ments as separate entities but that the composite information
of the trustee is not to be taken as actual knowledge of the
officers of its trust department, and such actual knowl-
edge was held necessary to supply the element of intent involved
in gross negligence.
The doctrine laid down in the Browning case was affirmed
in Hfazzard v. Chase National Bank,"6 and a result favorable to
the trustee was reached. In that case the holders of a $10,000,-
000 debenture issue sued the trustee for allowing the issuer to
substitute worthless holding company stock for the operating
company stock originally deposited. It was expressly provided
in the trust indenture that other stock could be substituted upon
the certificate of the issuer as to earnings of the stock to be
substituted.1 7 The trustee was given the power to investigate
independently but no such duty was imposed upon it and it
could, if it chose, treat these earning certficates of the issuer as
conclusive on their face. The trust deed further exempted the
trustee from liability for the negligence of any of its agents or
for any contingency except its own gross negligence or bad
faith."" Officers of the issuer were heavily indebted to the
Chase National Bank; the bank was represented on the board of
directors of the issuer. The court held that the plaintiffs could
not recover from the bank for its negligence in permitting the
withdrawal or substitution. It reasoned that even were it
assumed that all the knowledge of the Chase Bank, gained by
virtue of its various conflicting positions, were imputed to it as
'md. at 324. The court observed that the institution Itself, rather
than just one of its departments, was the trustee.
116 159 Misc. 57, 287 N. Y. S. 541 (1936).
7id. at 60, 62, 287 N. Y. S. at 545, 547.
"Id. at 62, 287 N. Y. S. at 546.
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trustee nevertheless by acting within the terms of the indenture
the Chase Bank had successfully avoided the liability which
would undoubtedly have attached in the absence of the exemp-
tion clause.119
Although the result reached in the Brouming case was
reaffirmed the court in the Hazzard case warned that the impu.
tation of knowledge from one department to another may, of
itself, suffice to charge a corporate trustee with gross negligence.
Another important case bearing upon liability of trustees
where an immunity clause is involved is Starr v. Chase National.
Bank. 12U In that recent case the defendant was successor trustee
under a trust indenture covering a bond issue by a German cor-
poration. Upon the passage of German moratorium laws the
issuer failed to make interest and principal payments. Although
the pledged security was in Germany and could not be
reached the defendant bank had made unsecured loans to the
debtor corporation and held in its commercial department
enough of its free assets to meet the outstanding indebtedness
to the bondholders. The defendant allowed these assets to be
taken out of the country in spite of an adjudication,121 of
which the defendant had notice, that the German laws were no
defense to a suit on the bonds. In a representative action by
the bondholders against the trustee, judgment was for the plain-
tiffs, the court holding that such conduct by the trustee was
repugnant to the trust and amounted to bad faith. Exculpatory
clauses were held to give no protection under the circumstances
and a duty to attach the "free assets" was implied.
So it would seem, from the Starr case, that although the
trustee ordinarily has the right to remain inactive or to exer-
cise a power, it has no such privilege where bad faith is pres-
ent. Such bad faith is found where the trustee either takes
advantage of its knowledge or its position to further its own
.11 The judges who tried the Hazzard case concluded that legisla-
tion was necessary if debenture holders are to be given the protection
which covenants in their debentures purport to assure. Hazzard v.
Chase National Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 85, 287 N. Y. S. 541, 571 (1936).
"N. Y. L. J., Sept. 21, 1936, p. 771, col. 6 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.).
Glynn v. United Steel Works Corp., 289 N. Y. S. 1037 (1936), in
which the defendant was ordered to turn over the property of the
United Steel Works Corp., successor to the original German corpora
tion, to the sheriff.
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ends, at the expense of bondholders, and in such a situation an
immunity clause is of no avail.
Cases involving the duties of indenture trustees have often
been described as falling into two classes,122 in one of which
their duties are said to be strictly limited by the indenture,
while in the other additional duties are implied from the nature
of the trust relationship. 123 In line with this statement the
Hazzard case has been pointed out as exemplifying the "basic
division of authority on the extent of the duties and liabilities
of a corporate trustee,' '124 and adopts the view that the powers
and duties of the trustee are derived exclusively from contract,
the word "trustee" as applied, being a misnomer. 12 5 The same
source also points out the Starr case as representing the weight
of authority holding that there exists between the trustee and
the bondholders, by reason of their respective positions, a fidu-
ciary relationship which may be modified but not obliterated
by contract and that consequently the usual provisions that the
trustee, while empowered to act on behalf of the bondholders
in almost any conceivable situation, shall be under none of the
corresponding duties, can have no greater effect than the
general immunity clause, which, assuming its validity, is uni-
versally conceded not to remove liability for gross negligence
or bad faith.
26
On the other hand, an equally good authority 12 7 argues that
the above statement "creates an appearance of a division of
authority, with the implication of choice between conflicting
rules, which the cases do not justify. "125 It has previously been
pointed out that the typical indenture confers many powers
upon the trustee. These powers may become duties upon the
request of a specified number, say 25 per cent, of the bond-
holders. The general immunity clause exempts him from all
liability except that arising from gross negligence or bad faith.
See (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 130.
20 Payne, Exculpatory Clauses in Corporate Mortgages and Other
Instruments, 19 Corn. I, Q. 171, 173 (1934); Posner, Liability of the
Trustee Under the Corporate Indenture, 42 Harv. L. Rev. 198, 244
(1928).
2 (1937) 37 Col. L. Rev. 130.
= Ibid.
mId. at 131.
'" (1937) 46 Yale L. J. 866.
81d. at 868.
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If the trustee has no actual knowledge of facts which might re.
quire him to take action to protect the interests of bondholders
the provisions of the indenture may be followed even to such an
extent as indulging in a little negligence, 129 -without incurring
liability to bondholders. 130 Regardless, however, of the terms
of the indenture, liability may be imposed upon the trustee for
failure to act where its appropriate officers have knowledge of
the necessity to act for the bondholder's protection,13' and no
case holds that in spite of such knowledge the trustee need not
act. In most of the cases in which non-indenture duties have
been implied, the duty was based upon the fact that the trustee,
because of knowledge, was in a position to act to protect the
bondholders. 32 In such a case the general immunity clause
will protect the trustee from liability for negligence in failure
to investigate every possible opportunity for action. But if
responsible agents of the trustee have knowledge of facts which
raise a duty to act, a failure under such circumstances to act is
clearly gross negligence or willful default and no protection can
be found in the general immunity clause. 133
It is readily apparent from this reasoning that the court
in the Starr case was not faced with the necessity of choosing
between two conflicting lines of opinion but only with the
)question of whether the trustee had sufficient knowledge of
the obligor's default as to create a duty to act and sufficient
knowledge of an opportunity to act for the protection of the
bondholders. Since this was found to be the fact then clearly
the case came within the definition of willful default negatively
worked out in the Brn~ming and Hazzard cases.
It may be seen from these cases that the indenture com-
__Fleener v. Omaha National Co., 267 N. W. 462 (Neb., 1936);
Hazzard v. Chase National Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 287 N. Y. S. 541 (1936).
'*Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., 250 Fed. 321 (C. C. A. 3d,
1918); Benton v. Safe Deposit Bank, 255 N. Y. 260, 174 N. E. 648
(1931); Hazzard v. Chase National Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 287 N. Y. S.
641 (1936).
"I Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., Hazzard v. Chase National Bank,
both supra note 130.
lu Rhinelander v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 172 N. Y. 519, 65
N. E. 499 (1902); Patterson v. Guardian Trust Co., 144 App. Div. 863,
129 N. Y. S. 807 (1911); Harvey v. Guaranty Trust Co., 134 Misc. 417,
236 N. Y. S. 37 (1929).
2"Browning v. Fidelity Trust Co., Hazzard v. Chase National
Bank, both supra note 130.
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monly attempts to prescribe criteria for trustee action and thus,
in effect, to define the standard of gross negligence and willful
default. The specified criteria confer, generally, a privilege
upon the trustee to exercise a power without consulting all the
factors reasonably bearing on risk. But where other factors
known to the trustee are so compelling as to demand the use of
other than specified criteria, reliance on the indenture pro-
vision alone may well fail to prevent a finding of gross negli-
gence or willful default. The most carefully drawn indenture
cannot free a trustee from the duty to act in the bondholder's
interest when it requires knowledge that there is both a necessity
and an opportunity for such action.
CONCLUSION
Obviously, there is drastic need for a stricter regulation
of the trustee under indentures. Especially is this true if the
trustee is to continue to perform the necessary function in
corporate finance for which it was originally created, and, at
the same time, hold public confidence in an institution which in
the past few years has been buffeted about by waves of criticism
from all sides. Although there is indicated this need for legis-
lative regulation it should be pointed out that care must be used
in preventing suggested legislation from taking too restrictive
a course. It should be broad in scope and embrace all parties
participating in the financial transaction. As previously noted,
the modern trust indenture has been long in the making and
years of experience in the drafting of such documents have
gone into the creation of this imposing instrument of modern
finance. Admitting that it has not yet reached a stage of de-
velopment where nothing more can be desired, in spite of the
care and judicial direction that has aided in its construction, it
is not too much to say that it cannot now, at one stroke of
governmental fiat, be'brought to perfection.
Much can, however, be done through legislative measures
to improve the instrument which has been found at times to
be "utterly unjust to the investing public." It is no doubt true
that even the trustee institutions would welcome some sort of
regulatory control of indenture provisions that tend to thwart
the rights of the investing public if, at the same time, adequate
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and practicable standards were made to prevail for all parties
to the transaction, including the corporation and the house of
issue. The issuer and the underwriter who, after all, reap the
greater part of the harvest, and who are more directly concerned
in the marketing of the securities, should be compelled to bear
an equal responsibility in the drafting of the trust deed. The
trustee who has no stake in the transaction, theoretically speak-
ing, other than a moderate compensation for its services, has
not been expected to conduct or even to participate in the trad-
ing between the issuer and the underwriter. The fact that
actually, as previously pointed out, the trustee often makes a
stake for itself, using the excuse of small compensation for a
great amount of work, and thus places itself in a position of
conflicting interest with the bondholders, should, however, be
taken into account in the future and trustee institutions com-
pelled to participate more actively in the drafting of the in-
denture. It is in the power of the trustee to eradicate many
pernicious practices which have recently come to light, con-
cerning which the S. E. C. Report is a sufficient chronicle, since
the underwriter, who is largely responsible for them, can work
only through the trustee. If the compensation of trustees, the
degree of participation which they must make in the drafting
of the indentures, and the extent to which they may go in taking
interests contrary to those of the bondholders, were rigidly stat-
ed and enforced, there would be few instances in the future of
almost complete decimation of bondholder interests through lack
of adequate representation on the part of their trustee. If, how-
ever, the trustee is to have greater duties, it should be adequately
compensated for the greater risks that are implied. Generally its
fees have been few and moderate. If, however, greater vigilance
on the part of the trustee is obtained, an increased reward is
not too great a price to pay.
The fact that at the present time we are experiencing a
revival in financial activities makes this an appropriate time
to adopt measures for the improvement of corporate indentures
and to increase the duties of trustee in default in order to guard
effectively the interests of the investing public. This important
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document, the trust indenture, cannot and must not remain un-
changed in the face of present economic and social trends.134
"'Since the completion of this article Mr. Barkley of Kentucky
has introduced a bill into the United States Senate which aims at the
correction of some of the evils in the trust indenture method discussed
here. Neither time nor space permits this writer to consider the bill
in these pages but in order to keep abreast of the latest developments
In this field the reader is urged to make an examination of same.
